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Class Mobility and Political Preferences:
Individual and Contextual Effects l
Nan Dirk De Graaf and Paul Nieuwbeerta
University of Nijmegen
Anthony Heath
Nuffield College
The authors test several hypotheses about the impact of intergener-
ational class mobility on political party preferences. Tests using
cross-national data sets representing Britain, the Netherlands, Ger-
many, and the United States over the period 1964-90 suggest a
process of acculturation to the class of destination. The authors
hypothesized that a class with a high degree of demographic identity
influences newcomers more than a class with low demographic
identity does and that, the more left-wing inflow there is into a
class, the more likely the immobile members are to have left-wing
political preferences. The data did not confirm these hypotheses. A
macro analysis does, however, show that the level of class voting
is weakened by a compositional mobility effect.
INTRODUCTION
It is generally true that a member of the working class is more likely to
vote for a left-wing political party than is a member of the middle class,
although the extent of such class voting varies greatly between countries.
In Britain, for example, it is relatively strong, whereas in America, par-
ticularly in recent years, it has been rather weak. Moreover, even in
countries where class voting is relatively strong, the proportion voting
for the "natural" party of their class rarely exceeds 60% (Heath et al.
1991, pp. 68-69).
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To understand fully the relationship between class position and politi-
cal preference one has to remember that socioeconomic classes in the
advanced industrial societies are far from homogeneous and static. In all
Western countries, although not always to the same extent, people move
up and down the social ladder with respect to their parents. Processes of
social mobility, therefore, may help to explain "class-deviant" behavior
within a country (Abramson 1972).
A number of empirical studies have investigated the impact of social
mobility on voting behavior (Lipset and Zetterberg 1956; Lipset and
Bendix 1959; Barber 1970; Abramson 1972; Kelley 1992; Turner 1992;
Weakliem 1992). Most of these adopt a microsociological perspective and
focus on the impact of an individual's mobility experience on his or her
voting behavior; almost invariably they have shown that the political
behavior of the mobile is intermediate between that of the stable members
of their origin and destination classes. However, there is also an older
tradition of macrosociology that looks at the emergent properties of social
formations (Durkheim 1897; Blau 1964; Blau and Schwartz 1984). That
is to say, rates of social mobility may affect the degree of cohesion and
solidarity within a particular class, and this in turn may influence the
overall level of class voting.
Mobility processes may therefore have important consequences for lev-
els of class polarization, and they may help to explain both over-time
and cross-national variations in class voting (De Graaf and Ultee 1990;
Heath et al. 1991; Nieuwbeerta 1995). In particular higher absolute rates
of mobility may be expected to reduce class polarization by increasing
the proportion of mobile voters with intermediate propensities to support
the left (which we term compositional effects) and also by weakening
class solidarity and pulling even the nonmobile voters toward the center
(which we term the contextual effects on the immobile).
In this article we first discuss two main theories of the relation between
class and political preference. On the basis of these theories we suggest
some micro hypotheses about the effects of an individual's mobility expe-
riences on political preferences. Next, we consider macro hypotheses
about the compositional and contextual effects of mobility rates. In the
next four sections, we describe our data, discuss our models, and present
the results of testing our micro and macro hypotheses. In these tests we
restrict ourselves to the analysis of men. De Graaf and Heath (1992) have
shown that working women should not be assigned to social classes solely
on the basis of their husband's occupation or solely on the basis of their
own occupation. For women, more complex models are required that
take account of the interactions between husbands' and wives' occupa-
tions. We therefore believe that women's mobility deserves a separate
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treatment in its own right, and we hope to present this in a separate
publication.
MICRO EFFECTS OF INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
ON POLITICAL PREFERENCE
In order to obtain a better insight into the consequences of intergenera-
tional class mobility for political preference, we begin with two main
theories of individual voting behavior. The first is the economic theory
of political behavior (Downs 1957), sometimes also known as the "instru-
mental" theory. The basic idea here is that voting behavior is rational
and self-interested: People vote for the party whose policies will bring
them the greatest utility in the future. Class voting can then be explained
on the grounds that people in lower social classes have an interest in
redistributive policies, which are typically espoused by left-wing parties,
while the members of higher social classes have an interest in opposing
such policies (Lipset et al. 1954; Converse 1958).
The second theory, labeled by Heath, Jowell, and Curtice (1985, p. 9)
as the "expressive" theory, perceives voting as a social act rather than
an instrumental act. The assumption of this theory is that political identi-
ties are developed through interaction with others. Voting behavior is
thus an expression of a political identity and will in turn reflect the norms
and values of one's normative reference group. With this theory, too, it
is rather straightforward to explain the relationship between class posi-
tion and political preference. In many cases a person associates with
other people occupying the same class position. They are raised by them,
live in the same area, attend the same school, work together as col-
leagues, and thus learn the traditional culture of their shared class. Con-
sequently, they will vote as their class members traditionally vote.
Although these two theories are quite different with respect to their
initial assumptions, in predicting the relation between class and political
preference, they are not contradictory but complementary (Heath et al.
1985, p. 9). To phrase the complementary character of both theories:
People can vote for the same party both because of their mutual interest
and because they are influenced by each other. We might add that associ-
ating with others from the same class may make people more conscious
of their common interests and of the party that serves their interests best.
However, the two theories do have rather different implications for
the relationship between social mobility and political preference. In its
simplest version, the instrumental theory predicts that the political pref-
erences of the mobile will be identical to those of their class of destination,
although, given the evidence on countermobility (Girod 1971; Goldthorpe
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1980), one might expect there to be some modest influence from social
origins too. That is, some people might expect their current class positions
to be temporary and might anticipate returning to their class of origin;
hence they might define their long-run interests as those of their class of
origin. On the basis of the instrumental theory, therefore, one would
predict that the political preferences of the mobile will be closer to the
typical political preferences of their class of destination than to that
of their class of origin. This is what De Graaf and Ultee (1990) called
the "economic hypothesis," and it is our first hypothesis at the micro
level.
The expressive theory, on the other hand, predicts a larger role for
social origins, since the culture of one's origin class is likely to be particu-
larly important in early political socialization. However, the older some-
one is, the more distant is their primary socialization in their family and
class of origin and, conversely, older respondents will in general have
had a longer period in their class of destination (most intergenerational
class mobility between the broad classes that we have identified takes
place at a relatively early stage of the career and little occurs after the
age of 35; Goldthorpe 1980, pp. 69-71). Our "acculturation hypothesis"
therefore states that the older one is the more the impact of the class of
origin diminishes relative to that of the class of destination. This hypoth-
esis is in line with Blau's "pattern of acculturation" (1956) and follows
directly from the expressive theory. It is unlikely that the mobile will
have no social contacts with their class of origin. Social networks change
slowly, and it may take time for the mobile to integrate socially into their
class of destination and to lose their old social identity.
A further issue that has often been raised is whether there is an asym-
metry in the patterns of adaptation of upwardly and downwardly mobile
people. Lipset (1960), for example, assumed that upwardly mobile people
adapt more quickly to their destination class than do those who are
downwardly mobile. His underlying idea was that people in general pre-
fer to adopt the more prestigious identity and, thereby, to maximize their
status. We term this the status maximization hypothesis. That is, people
may prefer to take as their normative reference group whichever is the
higher of their classes of origin and destination. The "status maximiza-
tion hypothesis," then, is that downwardly mobile persons orient them-
selves more to their origin class, while upwardly mobile persons will
orient themselves more to their destination class. 2 Similar statements
2 We would like to emphasize that this hypothesis is not just the prediction that
political preference will be a weighted average between origin and destination. The
literature on social mobility and political preference often suggests that, due to the
"shock of mobility" (comparable to the often assumed status inconsistency effect),
mobility has an extra independent effect. Turner (1992) labels this the "effect of
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have been made by Parkin (1971, pp. 51,54), Knoke (1973), and Thor-
burn (1979), although subsequent empirical research has generally failed
to confirm this hypothesis (Abramson 1972; De Graaf and Ultee 1990;
Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1993; Clifford and Heath 1993).
MACRO EFFECTS OF INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
ON POLITICAL PREFERENCE
The theoretical questions raised at the macrolevel include some of the
central ones of stratification research, for example, questions about the
potential for class-based collective action. The classic statement of this
was Marx's explanation for the absence of social classes in America.
Thus in a well-known passage, Marx (1926, p. 33) argued that in America
"classes are not yet fixed, but in continual flux, with a persistent inter-
change of their elements." In other words, high rates of social mobility
undermine class formation. Sorokin (1957, p. 538) argued that social
mobility facilitates atomization and diffusion of solidarity and antago-
nisms. Similar ideas have been widespread in the many accounts of
the decline of class in contemporary societies: Increasing rates of social
mobility have, it is claimed, tended to weaken the cohesion of the classes
and have been one of the factors in class dealignment (Clark and Lipset
1991).
Goldthorpe (1980) has followed up these broad claims with more spe-
cific hypotheses in his work on class formation. He distinguishes between
the demographic identity of a class (defined by its patterns of inter- and
intragenerational mobility) and the sociopolitical orientations that demog-
raphy may promote. The implications of these demographic consider-
ations for normative patterns seem clear enough. As Goldthorpe suggests
(1980, p. 268), "the fact that over recent decades [the service class] has
recruited from very diverse sources must have seriously reduced its socio-
cultural distinctiveness; to some extent mobile men carry with them the
normative and relational patterns of their class origins into their class of
destination, and thereby increase its internal heterogeneity. However,
the case of the working class is clearly a different one. It is from its
recruitment patterns-that is from the homogeneity of the social origins
of its members-that its demographic identity primarily derives; and in
turn, one may then suppose, its sociocultural homogeneity is in this way
also favoured."
There are two rather different ways in which one could interpret these
ideas and then put them to the test-the compositional and the contex-
mobility per se." We feel that our status maximization hypothesis is a more specific
hypothesis on mobility effects.
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tual. First, within an individualistic perspective, one might claim that
the sociocultural orientations of a class are simply the summation of those
of the individuals that make up the class. We term this the "composi-
tional interpretation." As the service class expands and includes more
people from non-service-class origins, so its demographic homogeneity
will decline. If these newcomers retain to some extent the political orien-
tations of their class origins, and if these orientations are different from
those of the stable members of the class of destination, it follows arithmet-
ically that the political complexion of the class as a whole must change.
However, it is important to acknowledge that it is not just the amount
of inflow mobility that may be important. The impact of inflow mobility
may also depend on the political preferences of the newcomers. For exam-
ple, we know that the political preferences of the service class are not
very different from the preferences of the routine nonmanual class
whereas the manual class differs substantially in this respect. This sug-
gests that inflow into the service class from the routine nonmanual class
may have less impact politically than the same amount of inflow from
the manual class. The compositional effects of mobility depend, there-
fore, both on the amount and on the political character of that mobil-
ity.
However, we might also wish to argue, on Durkheimian lines, that
the culture of a class is more than the sum of individual orientations. In
other words, class culture may be an emergent property of the class,
deriving from the interaction between the individuals who currently
make up the class. Thus a class with a high degree of demographic
identity may have a stronger normative subculture than one with a lower
degree of demographic identity, and this in turn may exert a stronger
pressure on newcomers to the class. The process of acculturation to the
norms and values of the class of destination may be faster and more
complete if the class has a high degree of demographic identity. We
term this the "contextual interpretation." Weakliem (1992, p. 155) neatly
summarized this argument as follows: "Effects of origin and destination
class may vary according to the nature of socialization of different classes.
Some social groups (classes) may have a strong culture which places a
definite stamp on newcomers.... Other groups (classes) may have little
sense of common identity and consequently little impact on the views of
new arrivals." Our "contextual hypothesis for the mobile," therefore,
states that a class with a low level of inflow mobility (and therefore a
high level ofdemographic identity) will have a greater impact on newcom-
ers than will a class with a higher rate of inflow mobility. 3
3 A similar hypothesis was postulated by Ultee and De Graaf (1991) to explain culture
consumption.
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So far we have considered only hypotheses about the behavior of inter-
generationally mobile individuals. Although most of the literature con-
centrates on the mobile, this is only half the story. As Blau and Schwartz
(1984, p. 55) have pointed out, immobile people too can be affected
by mobility processes: "Mobility has cumulative effects on intergroup
processes. First, since mobile persons have more intergroup associates
than nonmobile persons, many mobiles raise the group's average [our
compositional effect]. Second, they sometimes introduce their friends
from the two groups, initiating intergroup relations between these. Third,
the consequent high rates of intergroup relations in communities with
many mobiles indicate weaker ingroup pressures [our contextual hypoth-
esis for the mobile]. Finally, the relatively frequent intergroup re-
lations lessen ingroup salience, even among those who themselves are
not involved in intergroup associations, further facilitating contacts in
the future. The inference is that extensive mobility promotes inter-
group relations of a population's nonmobile as well as its mobile mem-
bers."
Thus if there is a large inflow into a class, the chances that an immobile
class member will be influenced by the newcomers may be relatively high
(see also Lipset 1960). The impact of the newcomers may be expected to
depend on the political orieritations that they bring with them, and so
our "contextual hypothesis for the immobile" is that the more left-wing
mobility into a class there is, the more likely are the immobile members
of that class to have a left-wing political preference.
DATA
While the micro hypotheses can be tested on a single data set from one
country, it is of some interest to test whether they hold true for other
countries or at other times. In the case of the macro hypotheses, more-
over, it is essential to increase the number of data sets. In our contextual
hypotheses the unit of analysis becomes the class and, with the six-class
schema that we use in this article, each data set thus yields six observa-
tions. In order to obtain an adequate number of observations we therefore
employ a total of 55 data sets from four countries: Britain, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United States. The data file for the Netherlands
contains 13 Dutch representative surveys over the period 1970-90. The
U.S. file consists of 17 GSS data sets over the period 1972-90. The
British file consists of seven National Election Studies covering
the 1964-87 period. For Germany the file is built upon 19 representative
surveys covering the period 1969-90. The surveys used are listed in
the data references list. The merged data files contain comparable in-
formation on respondent's class, father's class, and respondent's poli-
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tical preference. Additional comparable relevant variables that are in-
cluded in our data set are age, religion, ethnicity, and year of inter-
view.
From the data, we have selected male respondents: 11,949 for the
United States, 8,349 for Britain, 10,489 for the Netherlands, and 19,216
for Germany. From these respondents, we selected those 18 years old or
older who had a valid score on all relevant variables. These restrictions
reduce the number of cases to 9,372 for the United States, 6,168 for
Britain, 7,086 for the Netherlands, and 10,596 for Germany.
Political Preference
Political preference, our dependent variable, is measured in somewhat
different ways in the different surveys. In all cases in the British and
U.S. surveys (and in many of the German and Dutch surveys) respon-
dents were asked to name the political party they voted for in the most
recent national election. In the other German and Dutch surveys the
questions tapped vote intention. 4 In this article we use the phrase "politi-
cal preference" for all these measures. The difference between these
measures of political preference is a limitation that must be borne in
mind. However, experiments with the different treatments of the depen-
dent variable showed that our conclusions are not sensitive to these differ-
ences. In order to achieve a measure of international comparability we
have followed Bartolini and Mair's (1990) and Franklin, Mackie, and
Valen's (1992) procedures and dichotomized political preference into a
preference for left-wing parties (coded "1") versus other parties (coded
"0,,). 5
4 Surveys (see data references list) asked about voting preferences in the following
ways: which party the respondent voted for in the last national elections (Barnes and
Kaase 1976; Werkgroep Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 1977; Van der Eijk, Niemoeller,
and Eggen 1981; Van der Eijk et al. 1982; Van der Eijk, Irwin, and Niemoeller 1986;
ZUMA 1980; International Social Science Program 1987; Butler and Stokes 1963-66,
1970; Crewe, Saerlvik, and Alt 1974; Crewe, Saerlvik, and Robertson 1979; Heath
et al. 1983; Heath et al. 1989; Davis and Smith 1991); which party the respondent
would vote for if national elections were held today/tomorrow (Heunks et al. 1973;
Verba, Nie, and Kim 1971; Allerbeck et al. 1980; Felling, Peters, and Schreuder 1985;
Eisinga et al. 1990; Barnes and Kaase 1976; ZUMA 1988, 1990); which national
political party the respondent prefers (Hermkens and Van Wijngaarden 1976; CBS
1977; Arts et al. 1989); and which party the respondent expected to vote for in the
upcoming national elections (Kaase and Schleth 1969; Klingemann and Pappi 1969;
Allerbeck et al. 1980). Exact wording for the questions used in the surveys can be
found in the original codebooks.
5 The following parties are coded as left wing: Germany-Social Democrats, Commu-
nist Party, Independent Social Democrats, and Action for Democratic Progress; Neth-
erlands-Labour Party, Social Democratic League, Socialist Party, Revolutionary
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TABLE 1
SOCIAL CLASS SCHEMA
Number Title Description
EGP
Categories*
1 Service class
2 Routine nonmanual workers
3 Petty bourgeois
4 Farmers
5 Skilled and unskilled manual
workers
6 Agriculturallaborers
Professionals, administrators, 1, 2
and managers; higher-grade
technicians; supervisors of
nonmanual workers
Routine nonmanual employees 3
in administration and com-
merce; sales personnel;
other rank-and-file service
workers
Small proprietors and arti- 4a, 4b
sans, with and without em-
ployees
Farmers, smallholders, and. 4c
other self-employed workers
in primary production
Lower-grade technicians; su- 5, 6, 7a
pervisors of manual work-
ers; skilled manual workers;
semi- and unskilled, nonag-
ricultural manual workers
Agricultural and other work- 7b
ers in primary production
*Numbers indicate the categories of the EGP schema (Erikson et al. 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe
1992) that we have combined to define our categories.
Social Class
The social class variable is coded according to a collapsed version of
Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero's (EGP schema; see Erikson, Gold-
thorpe, and Portocarero 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). We use
this schema because it has proved to be useful in comparative intergener-
ational mobility research (Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman 1989) and
in analyses of the consequences of social mobility for political preference
(Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1993; Clifford and Heath 1993). Because of
limitations in the data (e.g., because in some surveys detailed information
on self-employment and supervisory status is lacking), we are not able
to use more extended versions of the EGP schema.
The class schema that we shall use is shown in table 1. Respondents
Socialist Party, Communist Party, Pacifist Socialist Party, and Democratic Socialist
'70; Great Britain-Labour Party; United States-Democratic Party.
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were coded into classes based on their occupation, self-employment, and
supervisory status. 6 We should note that the schema is not intended
to be strictly hierarchical and that it has a nonlinear relationship with
vote.
Age
We use AGE as our explanatory variable for testing the acculturation
hypothesis. This continuous variable is coded from - 22 (18 years old,
our youngest respondents) to 54 (94 years old, our oldest respondents).
The advantage of this linear transformation is that the score "0" is about
the average age in each country. We also need to take account of the
main effects of age on party preference. For this we include three age
groups (18-30, 31-50, and 51 and older) as covariates, since there ap-
peared to be typically nonlinear relationships between age and party
preference.
Other Variables
Although the impact of class mobility is our main theoretical concern,
we must also take into account the impact of other relevant variables.
Religion is particularly relevant, since we know, for example, that in
Germany and the Netherlands Catholics tend to vote for right-wing par-
ties, while there are religious differences in political behavior in Britain
and the United States (Heath, Taylor, and Toka 1993). We divided
church membership into five groups: Catholic, Protestant (Reformed),
Orthodox Reformed (for the Netherlands only), other denomination, and
no religion.
Given the importance of ethnicity for predicting political preference in
the United States, we include ethnicity (0 = nonblack; 1 = black) for
the United States only. For the other three countries there were no minor-
ity ethnic groups large enough that ethnicity could sensibly be included
as an independent variable.
A final important control variable is the year of interview, which we
recoded into a set of dummies representing several periods: 1961-65,
1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, and 1986-90. We clearly need to
control for the varying popularity of the political parties over the years.
6 Coding the respondents into the EGP scheme takes two steps. First, we recode the
original occupation codes into the International Standard Classification of Occupation
(ISCO) codes (ILO 1969). Second, we translate these ISCO codes into EGP scores
through the Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman (1989) recoding schema.
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HOW TO MODEL MICRO EFFECTS OF INTERGENERATIONAL
MOBILITY
Our hypotheses distinguish between the political preferences of mobile
and immobile individuals, and we therefore need a statistical model that
corresponds to these substantive concerns. Conventional approaches that
model political behavior as a function of origin and destination class will
not be appropriate since the explanatory categories will include mixtures
of mobile and immobile respondents. A substantively more appropriate
model, in our view, is Sobel's (1981, 1985) diagonal reference model/ in
which the behavior of mobile respondents is modeled as a function of
the behavior of the immobile respondents in the classes of origin and
destination. The model therefore allows us to test specifically whether
the mobile are closer in their political behavior to the immobile members
of their class of destination or to the immobile members of their class of
origin. 8
The theoretical importance of taking the immobile as the reference has
been suggested by Sorokin (1957, pp. 509-10), who argued that "if we
want to know the characteristic attitudes of a farmer, we do not go to a
man who has been a farmer for a few months, but go to a farmer who
is a farmer for life." Even better, we would argue, go to a farmer who
was born and bred a farmer. We can think of the immobile respondents
as representing the core of the class and defining its norms and values to
which newcomers mayor may not acculturate.
Sobel's original model was designed for predicting a metric dependent
variable. Given our binomial dependent variable, we fit instead of So-
bel's model a logistic version. The logistic version can be expressed as
follows:
prob(Yijk = 1) = 1/(1 + e- lin ); (1)
tin = PCXi + (1 - P)CXj + ~LCOVL' (2)
where Yijk = 1 if respondent k in the ijth cell of the mobility table has
a left-wing preference and 0 if not. Subscript j stands for father's class
and i for respondent's class. There is one parameter, cx, for each diagonal
cell, representing the expected mean behavior of the core (the stable
members) of each class. Parameters P and (1 - P) are destination and
origin weights that indicate the relative importance of the core destination
7 Models of this type were originally known as diagonal mobility models. De Graaf
and Ganzeboom (1990) argued that the label "diagonal reference model" is more
appropriate.
8 For a comparison of diagonal models with the conventional ones see Hendrickx et
al. (1993).
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and origin classes. 9 In equation (2) we estimate one ~ coefficient for
each covariate (cov). Consequently, if we have L covariates, we have to
estimate L ~ parameters. 10
RESULTS: TESTS OF THE MICRO HYPOTHESES
Table 2 presents the proportion of respondents with a left-wing political
preference in each category of the intergenerational mobility table in each
country (the different survey years being combined). We see that class
has a clear nonlinear relationship with political preference. The petty
bourgeois and farmers are by far the least likely to have a left-wing party
preference in the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain, while in all cases
the manual workers have the highest probability of a left-wing prefer-
ence. Farmers in America are the most notable exception to these general
propositions, and while there are similarities in the relationship between
class and political preferences in all four countries, it has to be said
that the similarity between the three European countries is particularly
striking. The anomalous voting behavior of farmers in the United States
is probably to be explained by the fact that the Democratic Party in the
United States, unlike the left-wing parties in our three European coun-
tries, has traditionally endorsed farm-support measures.
The size of the class differences in left-wing politics, do, however,
differ considerably. We can use the index of dissimilarity as an overall
measure of class differences in voting behavior. 11 The index proves to be
9 We assume the restriction that 0 ~ p ~ 1. The parameter p does not have this
restriction in the estimating procedure, however, because, in order to get the best
parameter estimate in the iterative procedure, p might get higher than 1 or lower than
o. The diagonal reference models do not offer the appropriate design when p does not
fit in the 0-1 interval, but this situation did not arise in any of the models used.
10 Sobel's (1985) more general model allows a separate ~ coefficient for each covariate
for each diagonal reference cell i. The logistic version is
prob(Yijk = 1) = 1/(1 + e- lin ); (1)
tin = p(at + ~Li COVL) + (1 - P) (aj + ~LiCOVL). (3)
We have, however, no reason to assume a different relationship between our covari-
ates and political preference for each diagonal cell. The advantage is that we have a
more parsimonious model and can therefore rewrite eq. (3) into the simpler eq. (2).
11 The usual method of measuring the level of class voting is the Alford index, but
this index can be used only when the classes have been dichotomized. The index of
dissimilarity does not require any restriction on the number of classes. The index is
obtained by summing the differences between the two distributions (Le., between the
class distribution of left-wing voters and the class distribution of right-wing voters)
and dividing by 2. It thus measures the proportion who would have to change their
political preferences to make the two distributions identical. The calculations in the
text refer to the overall class distributions, including both mobile and immobile respon-
dents, and have been calculated directly from table 2.
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rather low in the United States at 15 and highest in Britain at 36, with
the Netherlands (23) and Germany (22) in between.
Table 2 also shows, as previous research has done, that the political
preferences of the mobile typically differ from those of the stable members
of their class of destination. For example, in almost all cases individuals
who are downwardly mobile into the manual working class display a
lower level of left-wing political preference than do the stable members
of the manual working class. Conversely, individuals who are mobile
into the petty bourgeois tend to display a higher level of left-wing political
preference than do the intergenerationally stable petty bourgeois.
We now move on to formal modeling of these data and tests of our
hypotheses. To do this we combine the four national data files. We first fit
baseline model A, including one parameter for the destination and origin
weights (p and [1 - P]) and separate parameters for the religion, age, pe-
riod, 12 and ethnicity covariates. In this model we thus fit a common destina-
tion/origin weight but allow the covariates and the class parameters to dif-
fer in the four countries. The model therefore uses 63 parameters. 13 A more
parsimonious model that fitted common parameters for the classes and co-
variates could be explored, but since our primary interest is in the effects
of mobility, a conservative strategy toward these covariates is appropriate.
The reason for the country-specific modeling of the class parameters
is that we cannot assume the socioeconomic situation of a class to be
identical in the four countries. Furthermore, the left-wing and right-wing
political parties in our four countries may not be equally left- or right-
wing in their political stances and may not equally espouse perceived
class interests. For example, the Labour Party in Britain is substantially
more left-wing than the Democratic Party in the United States. 14 Since
12 We also fitted a dummy variable for each year instead of for each period. Using a
dummy for each year, however, results in a large number of parameters. This is
especially troublesome when we want to test whether the differences between the
countries are significant. Since reducing these parameters by applying five-year periods
did not change our results significantly, we preferred to apply these periods.
13 We use one parameter for the weight, six parameters in each of the four countries
for the diagonal reference categories, three parameters for religion in Britain, Ger-
many, and the United States, and four for the Netherlands, two parameters for the
age categories in each country, one for ethnicity in the United States, five for period
in Britain, four for Germany and the Netherlands (since the 1961-65 period is not
available in these countries), and three for the United States (where neither the
1961-65 nor 1966-70 periods are available).
14 In both the U.S. and British National Election Studies of 1992, identical questions
were asked about whether "the government should see to it that every person has a
job and a good standard of living ... [or] ... should just let each person get ahead
on their own." Respondents were asked for their own positions (on a seven-point
scale) and for their perceptions of where the parties stood. In Britain 63% of respon-
dents placed Labour on points 1 or 2 of the scale (the most left-wing positions) whereas
in America only 30% placed the Democrats on points 1 or 2.
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF LEFT-WING VOTERS BY RESPONDENT'S AND FATHER'S CLASS
RESPONDENT'S CLASS
Service Routine Petty Manual Agricultural All
FATHER'S CLASS Class Nonmanual Bourgeois Farmers Workers Workers Workers
Germany:
...... Service class ............. 32 (33) 34 (17) 22 (12) 33 (9) 46 (8) 11 (7) 35
0 Routine nonmanual .... 40 (10) 45 (11) 17 (6) o (1) 57 (5) 67 (5) 46......
0 Petty bourgeois ......... 28 (10) 28 (11) 12 (33) o (2) 37 (6) 52 (2) 28
Farmers ................... 21 (8) 19 (8) 15 (11) 7 (89) 37 (12) 18 (26) 25
Manual workers ........ 46 (38) 46 (50) 16 (38) 22 (5) 61 (65) 52 (35) 54
Agricultural workers .. 36 (1) 52 (3) 21 (1) o (2) 60 (4) 52 (25) 55
All .......................... 37 (100) 40 (100) 16 (100) 8 (100) 55 (100) 41 (100) 44
N ........................... 3,146 1,250 484 345 5,245 126 10,596
Great Britain:
Service class ............. 13 (32) 22 (21) 14 (13) 9 (10) 35 (6) 10 (10) 19
Routine nonmanual .... 15 (8) 33 (11) 25 (5) o (0) 42 (3) o (0) 26
Petty bourgeois ......... 14 (10) 20 (9) 11 (24) o (9) 31 (6) o (4) 20
Farmers ................... 16 (3) 7 (3) 25 (6) 8 (67) 50 (3) 24 (13) 27
Manual workers ........ 27 (46) 39 (54) 21 (49) o (10) 61 (76) 40 (26) 50
Agricultural workers .. 15 (2) 34 (3) 34 (3) 58 (4) 55 (5) 41 (47) 47
All .......................... 20 (100) 32 (100) 19 (100) 9 (100) 56 (100) 34 (100) 40
N ........................... 1,725 507 483 113 3,244 96 6,168
Netherlands:
Service class ............. 21 (36) 26 (23) 24 (11) 26 (3) 38 (10) 22 (6) 25
Routine nonmanual .... 28 (13) 34 (15) 13 (4) 50 (1) 46 (6) 33 (2) 33
Petty bourgeois ......... 19 (13) 28 (14) 7 (45) 6 (4) 37 (11) 25 (5) 23
Farmers ................... 18 (10) 16 (8) 11 (14) 5 (84) 27 (12) 12 (37) 16
Manual workers ........ 37 (26) 39 (37) 30 (21) 30 (4) 53 (55) 45 (20) 46
Agricultural workers .. 31 (3) 43 (4) 23 (5) 32 (5) 51 (7) 37 (30) 42
All .......................... 26 (100) 32 (100) 15 (100) 8 (100) 46 (100) 28 (100) 33
N ........................... 2,443 1,183 390 404 2,511 155 7,086
United States:
Service class ............. 31 (38) 31 (32) 23 (21) 9 (3) 40 (15) 14 (12) 33
Routine nonmanual .... 35 (7) 21 (10) 49 (3) o (1) 34 (4) o (0) 33
Petty bourgeois ......... 33 (7) 54 (7) 39 (15) 54 (2) 43 (7) 43 (4) 41
Farmers ................... 33 (12) 39 (10) 39 (18) 34 (84) 48 (19) 43 (46) 41
Manual workers ........ 35 (36) 42 (41) 36 (42) 38 (8) 49 (53) 29 (24) 43
......
0 Agricultural workers .. 40 (1) 95 (1) 73 (2) 72 (2) 60 (3) 63 (14) 62
......
...... All .......................... 33 (100) 38 (100) 35 (100) 35 (100) 46 (100) 39 (100) 40
N ........................... 3,148 930 447 367 4,393 87 9,372
NOTE.-Percentages of inflow mobility are given in parentheses.
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the level of class voting is likely to depend on the congruence between
perceived class interests and perceived party policies, we must clearly
take into account relevant national differences. By allowing the diagonal
parameters to differ between countries, we control for these differences.
Similar considerations apply to the covariates and, for example, to the
well-known national differences in the role of religion in voting behavior.
In this baseline model, the comparison of the origin and destination
weights allows us to assess our first hypothesis at the microlevel, namely
the economic hypothesis. In table 3 we report the fit (C 2 = - 2 log
likelihood) of this model. The quantity - 2 log likelihood does not have
a straightforward interpretation, but the goodness of fit of one model
relative to another can be assessed using the fact that, provided the two
models in question are nested, the difference has a chi-square distribution
with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the two models
in the number of their parameters.
TABLE 3
NESTED LOGISTIC DIAGONAL REFERENCE MODELS FOR THE RELATIVE
INFLUENCE OF RESPONDENT'S CLASS AND FATHER'S CLASS
ON RESPONDENT'S POLITICAL PREFERENCE
Model and Description G2 BIC dfUsed
A-Baseline ................................................... 39,194.3 -306,023.0 63
-~G2 ~BIC ~dfUsed
B-Acculturation ............................................ 39.8 -29.4 1
C-Status maximization ................................... 39.8 -19.0 2
D-Status maximization ................................... 43.8 -23.0 2
E-Status maximization ................................... 44.4 -13.2 3
Country-specific models:
AI-Baseline: Country-specific weight .............. 2.8 28.4 3
B1-Acculturation: Country-specific weight ....... 40.4 1.2 4
B2-Acculturation: Country-specific
acculturation ............................................ 46.7 -5.1 4
B3-Acculturation: Country-specific weight
and acculturation....................................... 48.5 24.4
Class-specific models:
A2-Baseline: Class-specific weight .................. 11.4 40.7 5
A3-Baseline: Class- and country-specific weight 47.1 192.4 23
B4-Acculturation: Class-specific weight ........... 52.8 9.7 6
B5-Acculturation: Class-specific acculturation ... 49.6 12.9 6
B6-Acculturation: Class-specific weight and
acculturation ............................................ 59.3 55.2 11
NOTE.-N = 33,222. Results controlled for respondent's religious denomination and age and for the
year of the survey. Equations for the models are given in appendix A. The G2, BIC, and df used are
reported for the baseline model; for the nested models the reduction in G2 (against the df) and BIC
compared to the baseline model are reported.
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The first model to be compared with this baseline model is the one
including an acculturation effect. The acculturation hypothesis predicts
that the older one is, the larger will be the influence of the destination
class relative to that of the origin class. In other words, this hypothesis
implies that the weight parameters vary according to the length of time
that one is a member of a class. Model B therefore includes an interaction
between age and the origin and destination weights. The equation of this
model is
prob(Yijk = 1) = 1/(1 + e- lin );
lin = (p + 8p X AGE)ai
+ [(1 - p) - 8p X AGE]aj + ~LCOVL.
According to this model the destination weight increases by 8p for each
extra year of age. Conversely, the origin weight decreases by 8p for each
extra year of age. This symmetry means that [p + (1 - p)] still sums to
1 (see De Graaf 1991).
On the standard criteria, this acculturation model results in a signifi-
cant improvement compared to our baseline model. Given our very large
sample sizes, it can be questioned whether the conventional criteria are
altogether appropriate, and we therefore report the BIC statistic too (Raf-
tery 1986), which adjusts the fit statistic by sample size and degrees of
freedom. The more negative the BIC, the better the fit of the model.
Table 3 shows that both on the C2 statistic (- aC2 / ad!) and the BIC
criterion, the acculturation hypothesis (model B) is to be preferred to the
baseline model. 15
Next, the status maximization hypothesis predicts that for the down-
wardly mobile the process of acculturation will take longer than it does
for the upwardly mobile. To test this, we have to define a variable (UP)
that indicates whether one is upwardly mobile or downwardly mobile.
Determining the direction of mobility is not straightforward, given the
categorical class scheme. We assume that those who move from any other
class to the service class are upwardly mobile (Le., those with origin class
2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 and destination class 1 have a score of "I" and others
have a score of "0").
The next question is how to test this hypothesis, since there are three
15 Since the diagonal model can also be considered as a restricted version of Duncan's
(1966) square additive model, we also tested the logistic version of the square additive
model. This model resulted in a BIC of - 305,886, while using 16 df more than the
diagonal model. The baseline diagonal model resulted in a BIC of - 306,023. There-
fore, besides theoretical reasons, we also prefer the diagonal version instead of the
conventional model for statistical reasons.
1013
American Journal of Sociology
possible interpretations (see Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1993). One inter-
pretation is that the rate of adjustment is the same among the upwardly
and downwardly mobile and that it is the extent of adjustment that
differs. Given this interpretation we can model an additional interaction
effect on the weight parameters. This is model C in table 3. 16 A second
interpretation is that the rate of acculturation is simply slower for the
downwardly mobile. Because the upwardly mobile gain status, they will
adapt faster to their class of destination than will the downwardly mobile.
We can test this interpretation by adding a second-order interaction term
between the variables UP and AGE. This is done in model D in table 3. A
third interpretation is that the first two interpretations are simultaneously
valid. This interpretation is expressed in model E in table 3.
As the BIC statistic shows, none of these three interpretations is prefer-
able to the acculturation model B. We should, therefore, reject the hy-
pothesis that the downwardly mobile and upwardly mobile differ in their
acculturation pattern. 17 This result contradicts earlier empirical studies
(for an overview see Janowitz [1970]) but is in line with the more recent
empirical results of De Graaf and Ultee (1990), Weakliem (1992), and
Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1993).
The conclusion so far is that the acculturation model B gives the best
representation of the data. We should note that similar nested model
comparisons for each country separately also showed the acculturation
model to be preferable. The acculturation model B assumes that there
are no differences between our four countries in the strength of the desti-
nation and acculturation effects. This assumption, however, may not be
warranted, and there may be country-specific mobility effects in the same
way that there may be some country-specific effects of class, religion, or
period. Our next step, therefore, is to test whether there are differences
in these effects between countries. The first country-specific model that
16 Given our definition of upward and downward mobility, we have a large number
of respondents who are mobile but neither upwardly nor downwardly. In models C,
D, and E we included an interaction term that only models an extra destination effect
for the upwardly mobile. A more strict test of our hypothesis would be to include an
extra interaction term for the downwardly mobile as well. This would imply that the
reference category comprises those who are mobile but neither upward nor downward.
However, these more complex models did not result in any significant improvement.
17 We would like to note that the statement "We should, therefore, reject the hypothe-
sis that ..." is not a standard statement, because the hypothesis being rejected is an
alternative hypothesis. Standard hypothesis testing allows one only to reject a null
hypothesis; in this framework one cannot reject an alternative hypothesis, but can
only fail to reject the null. In the Bayesian approach that underlies BIC, however, it
is perfectly valid to say that the data reject an alternative hypothesis, since they
provide evidence for the null. We are very grateful to an AJS reviewer for this
observation.
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we test assumes that the weight parameter varies among the countries
(model Al in table 3). This model does not lead to a significant improve-
ment, either on the G2 or the BIC criterion, over model A. We next turn
to variations on the acculturation model (Le., models B1, B2, and B3).
These models fit different weight parameters or different acculturation
parameters for each country. As table 3 shows, none of these models
results in significant improvement in fit compared with model B. 18
Hence, our conclusion is that both destination/origin effects and accultur-
ation effects are similar in all four countries under investigation.
The parameter estimates of our preferred model (acculturation model
B) are presented in table 4. The estimates for the covariates indicate that
religious denomination is an important predictor in all four countries. In
particular the Orthodox Reformed in the Netherlands have a relatively
low probability of having a left-wing political preference. Age has no
significant impact in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States.
Not unexpectedly, in the United States blacks have a higher chance of
having a left-wing preference than nonblacks.
The estimates of the diagonal reference parameters are presented in
table 4 as well. In order to help the reader interpret the parameter esti-
mates, we also calculate the predicted probability of having a left-wing
preference within each reference class for respondents who are 18-25
years old, nonblack, and nonreligious in the reference period. The diago-
nal parameters show that, with the exception of the United States, the
intergenerationally stable petty bourgeois and the farmers have the lowest
probability of having a left-wing preference. In all four countries the
manual workers and the agricultural workers have the highest probabil-
ity of having a left-wing preference.
Our main interest, however, is in the weight parameter p and the
acculturation parameter Bp. The weight parameter is .585 (SE = .018)
and the acculturation parameter is .005 (SE = .001). This suggests that
the cumulative impact of acculturation over the life span is indeed sub-
stantial. Thus our preferred model suggests that for 18 year olds (coded
- 22 on our AGE variable) in all four countries the relative destination
weight is .585 - 22 X .005, that is .475, and the origin weight is .525.
This implies that for our youngest respondents the effect of origin is
slightly more important than the effect of their current class. By the time
18 We experimented with various combinations of country-specific destination weights
and country-specific acculturation effects. Since our analyses for each country sepa-
rately showed, especially for the United States, a relatively strong acculturation effect,
we tested, for example, for U.S. exceptionalism. The upshot of all these nested model
comparisons is that the simple acculturation model B fits the data best, both by the
G2 and BIC standards.
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PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE ACCULTURATION MODEL B
Germany Great Britain Netherlands United States
et: Political Preference of Immobile
Service class ................ -.753*** -2.017*** -.655*** - .544**
(32) (12) (34) (20)
Routine nonmanual ....... -.416* -1.139*** -.054 -.353
(40) (24) (49) (24)
Petty bourgeois ............ - 2.087*** - 2.308*** -1.193*** -.323
(11) (9) (24) (24)
Farmers ...................... - 2.325*** -2.141*** -1.620*** -.255
(8) (l0) (17) (33)
Working class .............. .456** .339* .987*** .181
(61) (58) (73) (37)
Agriculturallaborers ..... -.074 -.555 .442 .370
(48) (37) (61) (38)
13: Effect of Covariate on Political Preference
Religion:
Catholic ................... -.953*** .444* -1.513*** -.217
Reformed/Protestant... -.227 - .260* -.783*** - .656***
Orthodox Reformed ... - 2.749***
Other ...................... -.337 .609* - .632* .382
No religion ............... 0 0 0 0
Age:
18-30...................... .135 -.123 .044 -.151
31-50a••••••••••••• •••••••• 0 0 0 0
51 + ....................... -.062 - .293* .259 .130
Ethnicity:
Nonblacka ................ 0
Black ...................... 1.697***
Period:
1961-65 ................... .691***
1966-70 ................... 1.023*** .849*** -.248
1971-75 ................... .614*** .524** .305 -.164
1976-80 ................... .575*** .175 .143 .490***
1981-85a .......•....•.•... 0 0 0 0
1986-90 ................... .408** -.082 - .417*** - .309**
NOTE.-Destination weight (P) equals .585***, effect of age on destination weight (BP) equals .005*.
Numbers in parentheses report probability of having a left-wing preference within the reference category.
a Reference category.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** P < .001.
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they have reached 65 years of age (coded 25 on our AGE variable), the
relative destination effect becomes .585 + 25 X .005, that is .710, and
the origin effect becomes .290. Although these figures indicate that the
destination effect is over twice the size of the origin effect, origin still has
some impact on the political preferences of 65-year-olds.
RESULTS: MACRO EFFECTS OF INFLOW MOBILITY
Compositional Effect
Table 2 confirms that a compositional effect of social mobility is present
and suggests that intergenerational mobility diminishes the "democratic
class struggle." For example, in Britain 61.2% of the stable members of
the manual working class had a left-wing political preference, whereas
the figure for the class as a whole falls to 56.4%. Hence, the compositional
effect amounts to - 4.8%. Conversely, the proportion of the service class
as a whole with a left-wing preference (19.7%) is greater than that in the
core service class (13.1 %). In this case the compositional effect is 6.6%.
In general, then, we find that the class differences down the main diago-
nal (that is, the differences between the core classes) are greater than the
differences between the classes taken as a whole. This is the case for all
three European countries, although it is less evident in the case of
America. (Since class has a weaker effect on voting behavior in the
United States, the compositional effects of social mobility, other things
being equal, are likely to be smaller too.)
Clearly, then, there are compositional effects, but as we argued earlier
the size of these effects will depend not only on the amount of inflow but
also on the political complexion of that inflow. For example, in the case
of Britain 24% of the manual class were newcomers coming from other
class origins, but the proportion of these newcomers with left-wing politi-
cal preferences was only .41, rather different from the proportion (.61)
of stable members who had left-wing political preferences. In the service
class, on the other hand, 68% were newcomers, but their political prefer-
ences were not so deviant from those of the stable members: 23% of
newcomers to the service class had a left-wing political preference, com-
pared with 13% of the stable members. The overall compositional effect
on the service class is thus (23% - 13%) X 68%/100 = 7% (which is
of course the same as the difference between the diagonal figure and the
figure for all service-class workers in table 2), while the overall composi-
tional effect in the manual class is (41% - 61%) X 24%/100 = -5%.
The greater volume of inflow into the service class, then, is partly can-
celed out by the lesser political deviance of that inflow, and the net result
is that the compositional effect on the service class is not notably large,
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despite the heterogeneity in its social origins. Similar results can be ob-
tained for the other European countries. Indeed, in Germany the compo-
sitional effect in the service class (5 %) is actually smaller than that in the
manual working class (- 6%) despite the much greater volume of mobil-
ity into the service class.
This compositional account ignores any processes of mutual interaction
and influence between the stable and mobile members of a class. It simply
takes the political preferences of the mobile and immobile as given. We
now move on to consider whether we can find any evidence for contextual
processes that might help to account for the political preferences of the
mobile and immobile respectively.
Contextual Effect for the Mobile
Our first contextual hypothesis states that a class with a low level of
inflow mobility (and therefore a high level of demographic identity) will
have a greater impact on newcomers than will a class with a higher level
of inflow mobility. First, however, we must investigate whether the social
classes vary in their impact on newcomers at all before we move on to
test whether the differing impacts on newcomers can be explained by the
rates of inflow mobility.
To calculate the impact of a class on newcomers, we fit models A2
and A3 (see table 3). Model A2 fits a separate weight parameter for each
destination class. The class-specific weight parameters that we obtain
from this model thus give us estimates of the different impacts of the
classes on newcomers. However, as we can see from table 3, this model
does not yield a significant improvement in fit over the baseline model
A. Model A3, which allows each country to have different class-specific
weights, is no more successful.
We have also experimented with various acculturation models that fit
class-specific effects (models B4-B6 in table 3). For example, in model
B5 we test whether it is the acculturation process (that is, the interaction
with age) that varies between classes. None of our investigations,t9 how-
ever, yielded a class-specific version that unambiguously displayed im-
proved fit compared with the corresponding class-uniform model. The
BIC statistic clearly suggests that model B is the best, while the standard
hypothesis tests indicate that B4, with class-specific weight parameters,
and B6, with class-specific weight and acculturation parameters, do fit
significantly better (B - B4: G2 = 13.0, df = 5; B - B6: G2 = 19.5,
19 For the sake of simplification, we present only a few of the models we tested.
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df = 10). For the moment we should perhaps use the Scottish judicial
verdict of "not proven." At any rate, we do not yet have sufficiently
good grounds to proceed with tests of the contextual hypothesis for the
mobile; if there are no class differences in impacts on newcomers, there is
nothing for us to explain, and we must a fortiori reject our first contextual
hypothesis for the mobile.
Contextual Effect for the Immobile
Our second contextual hypothesis implies that the extent and political
character of the inflow mobility will influence the political preferences of
the stable class members. Here, therefore, our interest is in explaining
the variations in the political preferences of the intergenerationally stable
members of each class. There are, as we saw in table 2, large differences
in the political preferences of these core classes, but we must of course
recognize that these are likely to be due to the distinct material circum-
stances and interests of the classes and not solely to mobility patterns.
We take this into account in our modeling by allowing each class within
each nation to have its own "natural" level of left-wing preferences.
(This is why we also estimated country-specific diagonal cells for our
models in table 3). In this way we can test whether rates of inflow mobil-
ity can account for variations around this "natural" level.
The essence of our model, then, is that the level of left-wing preference
in a particular year among the stable members of a given class in a
country is to be explained by the level of inflow into that class in that
year. In order to take account of the political complexion of the inflow,
we have to weight the inflow. The basic ideas can be represented by:
7ryin = PREF in + "I (INFLOWyin X WEIGHTin) + E yin , (5)
where 7ry in is the proportion of the stable members in class i, year y, and
nation n who support a left-wing party; PREF in gives the "natural"
level of left-wing political preferences among the stable members of class
i in nation n (and is measured by [6 X 4 - 1] 23 dummy variables);
INFLOWyin represents the proportion of class i in nation n and year y
who were intergenerationally mobile (that is, who came from social ori-
gins other than i). There are many possible procedures that could be used
for calculating WEIGHTin, but the one reported here uses the political
preferences of the stable members of the origin classes. 20
20 A numerical example may clarify our procedure. In calculating the left-wing inflow
mobility into the service class in Britain in 1964, we first take the actual proportions
of the service class in Britain in 1964 who were mobile from the other five class
origins. From the manual class, 47.2% were mobile. We then weight this proportion
by .612 (the proportion of the stable members of the working class who had a left-wing
political preference in the combined British data set, as shown in table 2). From the
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In this model the unit of analysis is not the individual but the class
(within a given nation in a given year). We therefore have 282 observa-
tions (and we naturally must weight these observations according to the
number of individuals on which they are based). Our dependent variable
is the proportion of that class with left-wing political preferences and is
therefore a continuous variable (and is approximately normally distrib-
uted). We can therefore use linear regression. The model explains 29%
of the variance, but the key parameter of interest, the parameter "I, is
nowhere near significant (t = 1.1). We therefore have to reject the hy-
pothesis that the more left-wing mobility there is into a class, the more
likely are the immobile members to have a left-wing political prefer-
ence.
Unlike our earlier microlevel analyses, the macrolevel model repre-
sented in equation (4) fails to control for the other characteristics of the
stable class members, such as their religion, age, and ethnicity. However,
further modeling that incorporates controls for these characteristics
reaches essentially the same conclusions. 21
agricultural worker class, 4.1 % were mobile, and we weighted this proportion by
.409. The weighted inflow to the service class in Britain in 1964 thus becomes 4.1 %
x .409 + 47.2% x .612 + 4.2% x .079 + 11.3% x .113 + 7.4% x .326 =
34.584%. These weights must be kept constant over time; if we allow them to vary
each year, we introduce a potential risk of circularity into the model: In some years,
quite independent of levels of mobility, there may be across-the-board increases in
left-wing political preferences affecting the mobile and the stable alike. Weights that
were allowed to vary each year might thus be correlated with the yearly variations in
the dependent variable. We are grateful to an AJS reviewer for suggesting this method
of constructing our explanatory variable.
21 One way to control for these individual-level characteristics is to use a multilevel
model (Burstein, Linn, and Capell 1978; Goldstein 1987). The first level becomes an
individual-level model in which we use exactly the same control variables as we did
earlier in the article. Our contextual model, expressed in eq. (4), then becomes the
second level. Within the multilevel framework, the dependent variable in this second
level is no longer the observed proportion with a left-wing preference but is the
intercept (for the given level-2 unit) from the level-1 equation. This intercept can be
thought of as the predicted probability of supporting a left-wing political party in that
particular level-2 unit for someone with the baseline individual characteristics. More
formally, the level-1 equation is
(6)
where tiny represents the intercepts for the level-2 units and there are L covariates, as
in eq. (2). The level-2 equation is
(7)
This is what is known as a random intercepts model. As with microlevel analysis, it
is appropriate to employ a logistic reformulation of these equations, and this can be
done easily. The analyses were conducted using the VARCL computer program.
Within VARCL, eqq. (5) and (6) are estimated simultaneously on the basis of the
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this article we modeled the impact of intergenerational class mobility
on political preference. For this purpose we used 55 cross-sectional data
sets representing the United States, Britain, Germany, and the Nether-
lands. These data cover the period 1964-90. We distinguished hypotheses
on the micro as well as the macro level. On the micro level we tested
three hypotheses using the design of Sobel's diagonal reference models.
We found that an acculturation model resulted in the best fit. Further-
more, a test of possible differences between the four countries revealed
that an acculturation model with the same destination weight and accul-
turation process in all four countries gave the best fit.
This commonality in the relative effects of mobility is a surprising and
important result in its own right. We might a priori expect to find sub-
stantial differences between the more traditional societies of Europe,
where class distinctions are believed to be more deeply ingrained, than
in a new society such as the United States. In the United States we might
have anticipated that the relative effects of origin might be smaller and
the acculturation process more rapid. But despite our large data set, we
could not reject the hypothesis that the same model applied to all four
of our countries.
To be sure, there are large absolute differences between our four coun-
tries in the size of the class effects on voting, and our results are the same
as those of other scholars who have shown that class voting is weaker in
the United States. The important finding is that the relative importance
of origin and destination for political preferences is not significantly differ-
ent in America. This result mirrors findings about the mobility process it-
self: While absolute rates of mobility tend to be higher in the United States,
relative mobility rates, or fluidity (as measured by the odds ratios), is not
exceptionally high in the United States (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1985).
On the macro level we tested one compositional and two contextual
hypotheses. Our results did indeed show the force of compositional argu-
ments. In general, mobility tends to weaken the "democratic class strug-
gle," but the effects of the amount of inflow mobility depend on the
political complexion of that inflow. While the service class, for example,
is a great deal more heterogeneous in its social origins than is the manual
working class in all four of our countries, we found that in the European
ones this heterogeneity was largely canceled out by the relatively right-
wing character of the inflow into the service class.
maximum-likelihood procedure (for a more detailed account, see Longford [1988]).
However, the results of the multilevel logistic analysis are essentially the same as
those of the simpler analysis reported in the text, and the parameter for the weighted
inflow, 8, remains nonsignificant (t = 0.43).
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While the occurrence of compositional effects is not, perhaps, very
surprising, it is more interesting to observe that they fail to account for
the relatively low class polarization in the United States. Even when we
look at the stable members of each class in the United States (the diagonal
cells), we find that class differences are small.
While the compositional effects of social mobility can clearly be quite
substantial, however, our article found little evidence for the more subtle
ways in which mobility can reduce class polarization through contextual
processes. We were not able to provide convincing support for contextual
effects either on the mobile or on the immobile. One possible explanation
for this is that contextual class processes simply are weak in contempo-
rary industrial societies. Contextual processes of the kind we envisaged
may require stable communities with fairly clear boundaries, high levels
of in-group interaction, and low levels of out-group interaction. These
conditions may be met for some social groups in contemporary society
but may be weak or absent for social classes. For example, there does
seem to be some evidence for contextual school effects, but it is likely
that schoolchildren interact much more with pupils from the same school
than with pupils from other schools. The social conditions under which
contextual effects emerge may, therefore, not be satisfied in the case of
social classes.
Alternatively, it may be that we have focused on the wrong aspects of
class. For example, patterns of intragenerational mobility and stability
may be more important than those of intergenerational mobility. Inter-
generational mobility tables give us only a snapshot; some people who,
in the snapshot, are intergenerationally stable may subsequently move.
This is particularly likely in a class like the routine nonmanual workers,
membership of which tends to be rather transitory. Conversely, intergen-
erationally mobile newcomers to the service class may have high proba-
bilities of intragenerational stability once they have arrived. It may there-
fore be that the core of the class, which defines its norms and values, will
consist of those who are indeed long-term members, but intergenerational
stability may not be a good indicator of long-term membership.
Another possibility is that the processes we hypothesized do occur but
over a much longer time scale. The more diffuse the patterns of social
interaction are, the longer it may take for mobility rates to shape class
processes. Processes that may emerge in a matter of months under the
conditions of intensive within-group interaction that may characterize
schools may take a generation to emerge under the conditions that charac-
terize social classes. Our evidence suggests that the process of individual
acculturation_to the political preferences of the destination class is a grad-
ual and long-term process, continuing over the life span. The same may
well be true of the contextual processes.
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It is too soon, then, to reject the contextual theories of class formation
and the expressive theories of voting behavior with which we associated
them. After all, the existence of acculturation is difficult to explain except
by the effects of social context. Ideally, too, we would use direct measures
of people's patterns of social interaction in addition to the indirect mea-
sures based on mobility rates used in this article. What we hope to have
shown is that the older tradition of macrosociological thinking about the
effects of mobility raises questions that are both researchable and are of
continuing interest.
APPENDIX A
Definitions of Models
General Models
A: tin = (p)ain + (1 - p)ajn + r3LCOVL
B: tin = (P + Bp X AGE)ain
+ [(1 - P) - Bp X AGE]ajn + r3 L COVL
C: tin = (P + Bpl X AGE + BP2 X UP)ain
+ [(1 - P) - Bpl X AGE - Bp2 X UP]ajn + r3LcovL
D: tin = (P + Bpl X AGE + Bp2 X UP X AGE)ain
+ [(1 - P) - Bpl X AGE - Bp2 X UP X AGE]ajn + r3LCOVL
E: tin = (P + Bpl X AGE + Bp2 X UP + BP3 X UP X AGE)ain
+ [(1 - P) - BPl X AGE - Bp2 X UP - Bp3 X UP X
AGE]ajn + r3LCOVL
Nation-Specific Models
AI: lin = Pnain + (1 - Pn)ajn + r3 L cOVL
Bl: lin = (Pn + Bp X AGE)ain
+ [(1 - Pn) - Bp X AGE]ajn + r3LcOVL
B2: tin = (P + BPn X AGE)ain
+ [(1 - P) - BPn X AGE]ajn + r3L c OVL
B3: lin = (Pn + BPn X AGE)ain
+ [(1 - Pn) - BPn X AGE]ajn + r3LCOVL
1023
American Journal of Sociology
Class-Specific Models
A2: tin = PiCXin + (1 - Pi)CXjn + ~LCOVL
A3: lin = Pincxin + (1 - Pin)CXjn + ~LCOVL
B4: tin = (Pi + 8p X AGE)CXin
+ [(1 - Pi) - 8p X AGE]cxjn + ~LCOVL
B5: tin = (P + 8Pi X AGE)CXin
+ [(1 - P) - 8Pi X AGE]cxjn + ~LCOVL
B6: tin = (Pi + 8Pi X AGE)CXin
+ [(1 - Pi) - 8Pi X AGE]cxjn + ~LCOVL
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